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─Summary
　There have been until today numerous attempts to compare the philosophy of Gille Deleuze 
with Eastern or ‘Oriental’ philosophy and thought. However, rather than hastily positing an 
affinity between both threads of thought, this paper aims at presenting a possible interpretation 
or ‘trans-local’ comparison of the works of Deleuze (1925~1995) and Toshihiko I zutsu 
(1914~1993).
　Following this interpretive approach, I  will in this paper examine the three following points. 
First, this paper will open with an interpretation in terms of language of the difference or 
contradiction between immanence and transcendent in both philosophies of Deleuze and 
Izutsu. Second, I  will explore the potentialities of the sentence ‘One is always the index of a 
multiplicity’ written by Deleuze in his last essay in light of Izutsu’s philosophical discourses. 
Lastly, I  will re-examine the series of notion of virtuality, singularity and void or nothingness in 
Deleuzian philosophy.
I ntroduction
　　In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze & Guattari did not hesitate to express their interest 
and in fact affirmation of a scheme of ‘oriental’ thought (ATP:261). However, we should be 
wary of a too hasty reduction of this thought to ‘Asia’ or the ‘Oriental’. In stressing this link 
with ‘Oriental thoughts’ within their philosophy, perhaps another point can be raised. For 
instance, in spite of his thoroughly atheistic and revolutionary posture, Guattari admitted a 
certain potentiality of archaic spiritualism, mysticism, and tribal shamanism in the 
production of subjectivity within emancipative politics. Even though Deleuze & Guattari 
never fell prey into ‘Orientalism’ in any sense, it is interesting to see how Deleuze 
expressed his interest in the philosophy of Zen Buddhism (LS:155,DC:67,WP:140). His 
conceptual preoccupation with Zen drew upon the surface of pure event and non-sense in 
itself.
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　　In his monograph on Deleuze, Out of This World; Deleuze and the Philosophy of 
Creation, Peter Hallward, undertook the project of a comparison of the philosophies of 
Deleuze and the Islamic thinker Al-Suhrawardi (1154~1191) regarding the question of 
ontological creation. Although Hallward is himself suspicious of this secret ontology of 
Deleuzian philosophy, his work does suggest the actual presence of a link of some sort 
between Islamic mystical thought and Deleuze’s philosophy. We can see another trace of a 
link with mystic philosophy latent in Deleuze in his argument on the concept of chaos. 
Generally speaking, D&G have no relationship with the notion of a deterministic chaos as 
advocated in contemporary sciences; their notion of chaos is about the cosmogenic. 
However, it should be noted that Francisco Varela, a reknowned specialist of auto-poiesis 
theory to whom Guattari was very much indebted for his ‘ecosophy’ , was himself a 
Buddhist. In addition the I talian activist thinker, Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, a friend of 
Guattari, was very interested in Zen Buddhism, although he considered Zen as a non-
religion. He even identified Radio Alice (a free pirate radio station in Bologna in the late 
1970’s) with a strange mixture between futuristic Dadaism, general intellect (in 
Autonomist Marxism) and Zen Buddhism. Guattari himself was however somewhat 
skeptical of Bifo’s involvement with Zen.
　　I zutsu Toshihiko (井筒俊彦 1914~1993) was a Japanese scholar of religious and 
linguistic philosophy, whose English (and sometimes, German) publications made him 
world-famous, as did his translation of the Koran into Japanese. He was an expert in 
Buddhism, Zen, Taoism and other mystical philosophies. Izutsu himself was very interested 
in the work of Deleuze&Guattari, especially the concepts of rhizome and nomadism, 
discussed in opposition to the arborescent system of thought of the West. He was also 
sympathetic with Derridian theory of deconstruction. In his one masterpiece, Psyche, 
Derrida himself wrote an essay on Izutsu and his philosophical works entitled ‘The Letter 
to Japanese Friend.’ But the issue is beyond the scope of this essay, which will exclusively 
propose a comparative and trans-local reading of Deleuze and Izutsu. Therefore this essay 
is not aimed at a mere introduction to Izutsu’s life and philosophy in comparison with 
Deleuzian philosophy, but is rather juxtaposed with Deleuze’s late works, especially the 
crucial─ but strange or enigmatic─ essay, ‘Immanence: A Life’, written nearly at the end 
of his life. 
I
　　The difference or contradiction between immanence and the transcendent since the 
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beginnings of modern philosophy must be re-examined in the un-conventional and 
unforeseen sense of a ‘coming’ philosophy, where immanence would not vanish in a 
synthesis effectuated by the transcendent or the transcendental. In Deleuze’s analysis, the 
pure plane of immanence and the transcendental field are never equated each other. How 
or in what manner do both moments intersect with each other? In humanities after the 
linguistic turn, any language is treated as a self-consistent system in which nothing can be 
identified as transcendent(al) or defined as an ultimate determinant instance of reality. The 
same goes for Deleuzian thought. A language as a capacity or potency of for signifiance─
a term used by D&G which means a generic emergent site of signification ─ does not 
consist in a collection of names that address the world as an object, but articulates the 
world through a process of differentiation in which it continuously re-articulates itself. 
Language as a self-referential system operates virtually in the plane of immanence, but its 
pragmatics always necessitates the duality of a meta/object level to be actualized in 
collective enunciations. This means that inter-subjectivity of speaking subjects or the 
grammatical code of a given language assumes a transcendent(al) position for the empirical 
or objective level of a speaking subject. This is a performative paradox latent in any 
language: the immanent assemblage of collective enunciation(s) is actualized in a 
transcendent(al)/empirical double, a process necessary for a human agency to be 
incarnated. The language can thus induce the emergence of a crystal between immanence 
and transcendence.
　　In Deleuze’s philosophy, the collision between immanence and the transcendent is 
manifested-expressed in the form-shape of a crystal. The crystal manifests the radical 
encountering between the virtual and the actual. ‘It is exactly on the plane of immanence 
that crystals appears’ (DC:114). Unlike ‘the archipelago or skeletal frame’ of concepts, the 
plane of immanence is the wave that un/rolls them up (WP:36). For D&G, concepts are 
concrete assemblages, whereas the plane of immanence is both abstract (machine) and 
fractal (assemblage); it is the horizon of events that allows for the series of concepts to be 
incorporated and actualized in the transcendent-empirical level. On the plane of 
immanence, the actual and the virtual always coexist one with another as crystals.
　　Insofar as Izutsu was under the influence of continental philosophers such as Hegel or 
Heiddeger, of Japanese philosophers such as Nishida, and also of more contemporary 
philosophies such as existentialism or structuralism, there is neither cases of using such 
terms as the plane of immanence nor the division between the actual and the virtual, the 
transcendental and the immanent. But a detailed reading of Izutsu’s philosophy can allow 
us to identify an argument that resembles Deleuzian philosophy. For this I  will now 
propose a comparative analysis of their theory of language and signifiance.
030 和光大学表現学部紀要　13 号
　　Following Deleuze&Guattari’s notion of signifiance as well as a general understanding 
of language in structuralism, we can say that language does not have an outside. I ts 
referential world coexists with itself or, more strictly, both are simultaneously co-generated. 
Certainly language addresses the outside world for signification, designation and 
communication. But the signification of language has its ground exclusively within the 
linguistic or semiological formation, itself dependent on a system of differentiation. How is 
it then possible to enact a signification or signifiance if language cannot rely on any 
exterior instance? Humans are provided with a capability of language but do not retain any 
articulated language in advance. This is because a potential for language emerges between 
two series constitutive of different planes of reality,  the series of articulation/
differentiation/cosmos and the series of non-articulation/un-differentiation/chaos. Deleuze 
defines the latter triad is as ‘the indefinite,’ which he remarks is not a mere empirical 
indetermination but what he calls a contingent determination by immanence, or a 
transcendental determinability (PI :30). For the indefinite or indistinction that is not yet 
‘articulated semantically’ ─ this is specific terminology to Izutsu’s religious linguistic 
philosophy which I explained in my previous essay ‘The Theory of Semantic Articulation 
in Izutsu Toshihiko’s Philosophy’ (The Bulletin of the Faculty of Representational Studies 
No.11)─ is always under the operation of signification.
　　In Izutsu’s semantic theory, as well as structuralism, the distinction between two states 
of articulation (semantic structuring) and non-articulation (non-semantic structuring) is a 
crucial moment for articulating the passage from Nature to Culture. The state of 
articulation is defined as a semantically or phonetically differentiated world. By the so-
called double articulation of linguistics, a system of sign is constituted in a process of 
differentiation. This is similar to what D&G called a ‘cosmic lobster’ or ‘a double pincer’ 
(ATP: 40), when God stands as an agency of double binding of the world. On the other hand, 
the realm of non-articulation is, in most cultural theory, usually identified with that of 
chaos in cosmology and disorder in Victor Turner’s type of anthropology. As Nietzsche 
carefully explained, this state of chaos is often defined as a Dionysian moment, while the 
world enabled by the linguistic articulation, usually called cosmos, is constituted as a 
symbolic and cultural order.
　　Rather than opting for the conventional dichotomy between cosmos and chaos, 
Deleuze stressed the twofold nature of Chinese and Japanese cinema, defined in terms of 
two definition of void as an opposition of in/articulation or in/differentiation. He thus wrote 
in his Cinema 1, Image/Movement:
　　‘Chinese and Japanese painting invoke two fundamental principles: on one hand the 
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primordial void and the breath of life which permeates all things in One, unites them in a 
whole, and transforms them according to the movement of a great circle or an organic 
spiral; on the other hand, the median void and the skeleton, the articulation, the joints, the 
wrinkle or broken stroke which moves from one being to another by taking them at the 
summit of their presence, following a line of the universe’ (CI:191)
　　I t is clear that Deleuze’s philosophy was also based on a theory of semantic 
articulation though one slightly different from Izutsu’s. Deleuze, despite of his respect to 
Nietzsche, did not make use of the term “Dionysian” to explain the obscure side of culture, 
that is, its non-articulated stratum of signification. He opted instead for a radical contrast 
between the primordial void and the central void (empty place or sign zero), the latter 
leading to skeleton, joints and articulation in the continuum of meaning. Izutsu as well 
never neglected this secret truth of so-called ‘oriental ’  philosophy, which is that 
philosophical conceptions are bound to an encounter with the void, non-articulation, 
indefiniteness and indifference. His belief in this ‘truth’ is thus clearly in line with D&G 
when they argue that ‘thinking provokes general indifference’ (WP:41).
　　In his famous preface of the works of Marcel Mauss, Lévy-Strauss remarked that a 
system of signification comes to term by way of the asymmetric gap and indefinite 
dynamics constituted within a couple of signifier/signified. For him, the signifier is always 
in excess of the signified. Meaning in a sign system would be given all at once, as the 
signifier flows freely, thus conveying a zero value without ascribing it to any particular 
signified. He called this zero value signifier a ‘floating signifier’, and linked it with what 
Mauss defined as mana in the incentive of gift economies (symbolic exchange) in 
Melanesian tribal language. 
　　By contrast, Izutsu ascribed the excessive part of signification to the signified. In his 
view, the signified retains the infinite range of meaning in relation to phonetics (as the side 
of a stream of sounds). The infinite series of sense/meaning unfolds in the transversal 
depth of consciousness where an amorphous flow of potentiality for signification is floating 
as a nebula. This formless potency of signified in excess would seek its correspondent 
signifier. Rather than a ‘floating signifier’, Izutsu seems to posit the notion of a ‘sunk 
signified’. In any case, what is at stake for both Deleuze and Izutsu is that there is ‘always 
already’ a constitutive gap of constant inadequacy between the signifier and the signified. 
In this manner the effect of signification holds the nature of absolute immanence, through 
which the transcendental field as a meta-level of communication is retroactively enabled.
032 和光大学表現学部紀要　13 号
　　Although Deleuze sometimes borrowed the notion of “floating signifier” defined by 
Lévy‒Strauss,  in A Thousand Plateaus,  Deleuze &  Guattari  propose a similar 
understanding of signification to Izutsu’s and locate excess on the side of the signified.
　　‘All signs are signs of signs. The question is not yet what a given sign signifies but to 
which other signs it refers, or which signs add themselves to it to form a network without 
beginning or end that projects its shadow onto an amorphous atmospheric continuum. It is 
this amorphous continuum that for the moment plays the role of “signified” , but it 
continually glides beneath the signifier, for which it serves only as medium or wall: the 
specific forms of all contents dissolve in it.’ (ATP:112)
　　It is striking that both philosophers emphasized the idea of a ‘sunk signified’ defined 
as an amorphous nebula, over a ‘floating signifier.’ They tried in this way to present the 
paradoxical status of immanence, that is of the autonomy of language.
I I
　　Deleuze’s declarative sentence ‘One is always the index of a multiplicity’ (PI :30) is 
very close to an idea of Izutsu’s philosophy. In his comparative understanding of Islamic 
philosophy (Ibn Arabi) or Sufism, Taoism and Zen philosophy, Izutsu also analyzed the 
phenomenal world, the multiplicity of empirical things, as a form of a self-manifestation of 
the Absolute and the One. In the conclusion to his masterpiece of comparative study 
entitled Sufism and Taoism, Izutsu argues that: 
　　‘It is a Unity because all the things that constitute Multiplicity are, after all, so many 
different phenomenal forms assumed by the Absolute (the Truth and the Way respectively). 
The phenomenal process by which the original One diversifies itself into Many is 
considered by Ibn Arabi as the tajalli, ‘self-manifestation’ of the One, and by Lao-tzû and 
Chuang-tzû as Shêng ‘producing’. And Chuang-tzû, in particular, further elaborates this 
idea into that of the universal Transmutation, wu fua, lit.‘ things-transforming’ (ST:473).
　　Izutsu’s philosophical attitude can be summarized by the expression ‘to see the One in 
the Many and the Many in the One, or rather to envision the Many as One and the One as 
Many (ST:68). This attitude induces what Ibn Arabi called ‘perplexity’ (hayrah), a concept 
that resonates with the Deleuzian series in notion of fold (folding/unfolding/refolding). For 
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Izutsu as well, it is a matter of finding a way to propose an ontological interpretation of 
multiplicity. As he says:
　　‘Multiplicity is not a static ‘differentiation’ of things that are rigidly fixed once for all, 
but is a constant life process which contains within itself the ontological tension of Unity 
in Multiplicity.’ (ST:366)
　　In Deleuze’s understanding, the One is not necessarily the transcendent that 
subsumes or comprehends immanence as content. Rather, immanence is compiled and 
folded within a transcendental field. This is why it is possible for him to argue that ‘One is 
always the index of a multiplicity’. The transcendental field embracing the One is defined 
as a pure plane of immanence, an absolute immanence, denying all transcendence of 
subject and object (PI:26). In fact, a life, for Deleuze, is immanence of immanence, absolute 
immanence (PI:27),while the transcendent field turns out to be a field of actualization.
　　In a similar way, Izutsu’s perfect man, by realizing the purification of Mind, defines 
the One as Nothing, operative within a metaphysical Void, forgetting the distinction 
between inside and outside, self and non-self. S/he can now perceive what Taoist sages call 
illumination(ming) and also what Ibn Arabi called ‘unveiling’ (kashf) or ‘immediate tasting’ 
(dhawq). S/he is one with the constant flux or stream of transmutation. From Izutsu’s view, 
the whole philosophical horizon of an Ibn Arabi, a Lao-tzu, or a Chuang-tzu (ancient 
Chinese philosophers) is the result of an altered state of mind, an ecstatic spiritual state of 
consciousness (ST:478).
　　‘The man in perplexity draws the circle’ says Izutsu quoting Ibn Arabi (ST:70), a circle 
that follows and draws for a cognitive subject the very circle of the self-manifestation of the 
primordial One, the Divine, or Absolute void. Man in perplexity as the subject of 
philosophical speculation is on the way toward the (ultimate) enlightenment, if it exists. At 
least, we can say that having carefully evaluated the possible falsifiability of a given 
argument, it is on the way toward the putative truth. It is quite interesting that Izutsu uses 
the term ‘plane’ in this context to explain how phenomenal concrete beings can diversify 
themselves into myriads of things and events. It is a process of ‘descent’ that is necessary 
to subsequently ‘ascend back into the original non-differentiation’ (ST:70).
　　In I zutsu's scheme of non-articulation and non-distinction (what is called in 
semiology), everything is at the level of the infinite considered as a total manifestation of 
reality in its entire development. ‘Bird is becoming flower and conversely flower is 
becoming bird.’ ‘When one sees flower, one would become flower as well’; this is the very 
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moment of pure experience in Zen’s ultimate enlightenment (Satori) and I zutsu’s 
philosophy, or ‘transmutation’. Transmutation in both ancient Chinese philosophy and Zen 
thought is to be treated as a certain kind of indiscernability and non-articulation (Zen:109). 
This is not a process of alienation, nor an emanation from one substance to another. It is 
rather a kind of transfiguration within a dynamic interaction between plural stages of 
articulation. In this sense, the One with which both Deleuze and Izutsu grappled is slightly 
different from Plotinus’s.
　　Following Deleuze, we can say that ‘immanence is immanent only to itself and 
consequently captures everything, absorbs All-One, and leaves nothing remaining to which 
it could be immanent.’ (WP:45). The One is immanent to the empirical and phenomenal 
world, which is completely beyond and in excess of any general human attempt at 
linguistic formalization, verbal conceptualization and semantic articulation. But it bears 
repetition that the One is neither merely transcendent nor is alteration or negation of a 
living milieu, but instead provides by itself a positivity for all empirical beings. For both 
Deleuze and Izutsu, the One is by and itself anterior to and independent from any 
categorical or conceptual definition of articulation. The One constitutes a full of dynamic 
energy flow rather than consisting in a mere series of negations. The One emerges as 
indefinite, indivision and non-articulation, while nevertheless functioning as the 
integrative moment of definition: it is an archi-articulation. As I  explained above, this 
moment of the indefinite and non-articulated has usually been understood as the plane of 
Dionysus or chaos within culture/civilization in contrast to the plane of Apollon, the 
moment of cosmos as order.
　　Although Christian philosophies have envisioned the presence of God beyond the 
notion of the One, both Deleuze and Izutsu were particularly careful about the common 
identification, equation and confusion of God with the One. In the traditional theological 
view, God was conceived as a divine unity embracing all existence. However the One to 
which both philosophers refer cannot be equated with an individual creator of the world, 
for it is by unfolding itself as absolute autonomy that the One undertakes a creation in an 
auto-producing process. The One is an agency that always precedes before it exists in 
reality and is the effect of articulated structure which allows for the existence of the 
empirical world.
　　In their What is Philosophy?, Deleuze & Guattari do not use the term the One directly. 
Instead, they adopt the expression ‘One-All’. The One permeates and subsumes everything 
insofar as the One is immanent to itself. In order to articulate their comprehension of 
immanence in a pure or ultimate mode, they invented a new terminology with the ‘plane of 
immanence’ indicating that all existence is an expression and development of the same 
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mode of agency. As such, there is no gap between transcendence and immanence or form 
and matter. Herein the Deleuzian thesis of the ‘univocity of being,’ completely distinct 
from the understanding of the One in the tradition of metaphysics, but resonating with 
Izutsu’s notion of the manifestation of the One and Absolute being in his interpretation of 
the philosophy of Ibn Arabi. Yet of course, Deleuze(&Guattari) never celebrated nor 
idealized the notion of the absolute, unlike a genealogy of religious philosophy.
　　The One, for Deleuze, is ontologically and radically indifferent to the question of 
Unity in a conventional philosophical sense. The One in Deleuze is called the univocity or 
the One of immanence, that is an omnipotent ability of binding and connecting what has 
traditionally been considered as divided: immanence and transcendence, the divided and 
the indivisible, articulation and non-articulation. In Izutsu’s view as well, the One is 
defined as a potency of unfolding of reality, a radical or archi-articulation. Its logic of self-
articulation of/within an ultimate reality passing through the process of non-articulation, 
is, in Izutsu’s view, conceptually crucial for both Sufism and Taoism (Zen philosophy can 
also be included). Despite the notion of absolute non-articulation (anti-cosmos), the One 
presents at the same time a tendency to constitute an empirical world by a process of self-
articulation in its every moment. Non-articulation itself is a moment of self-articulating 
dynamics realized by orienting all its flows of energy toward empirical reality. It is thus no 
longer possible to presuppose a distinction between articulation and non-articulation, 
transcendence and immanence, ideality and materiality.
　　It is the very theoretical context of understanding of the One that forced Deleuze (and 
Guattari) to invent a series of concepts such as the ‘plane of immanence’ and the ‘univocity 
of being’. Deleuze called this moment a kind of flash, a ‘singular event’ and ‘flourishing of 
iron’ (LS:155) in which both the articulated and the non-articulated constantly coincide 
with each other.
　　If the One is really immanent to itself, it must be devoid of transcendence as such, 
although it, as a ‘cosmic lobster’ (ATP:39) or radical potency for connecting and differing, 
can articulate and fold within itself both immanence and transcendence. The One 
permeates, subsumes and mutates the total multiplicity of existences through an infinite 
process of alternation between articulation and non-articulation.
　　When Izutsu addressed the mode of ‘the Many in the One and the One in the Many’ in 
his argument, he potentially raised the ontological question of counting. In the 
manifestation and development of the One, to exist is to belong to a certain condition or 
situation. Any given lived condition must ontologically be envisioned as a posited 
multiplicity, articulated along with a set of counting-as-one and through a singular 
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formation of counting, binding, grouping and belonging of multiple beings in the empirical 
and living world. The element of a set is understood to be an entity that is counted as part 
of it through the weaving of subsets for belonging and inclusion to meta/sets. A living 
situation of the world is defined as an articulated presentation of multiple-beings. Here the 
articulated means to be presented through the immanent process of one-ification, in which 
multiplicity is consistently counted as one. After all, the positivity of multiplicity itself 
cannot be guaranteed without addressing the One.
　　‘Nothing-ness’ however always resists the operation of counting as there is ‘nothing’ 
that cannot be posited as one. Certainly the nothing cannot be grasped in a situation or 
condition, because it cannot belong to a situation defined as above, as an element of 
conditionality of the phenomenal/cognitive world. It cannot therefore be counted as one by 
itself.
　　In I zutsu’s view, the One is sometimes presented as the nothing or void. The 
existential mode characteristic of the manifestation or unfolding of the One is defined by 
nothing-ness or void. Nothing-ness is not opposed to Being, which Izutsu defines as the 
absolute or the One. Rather, by aligning with Being as such, nothing-ness makes the 
cognitive and actual world existent as a relentless generic emerging in which the non-
existent becomes existent being in a process of alternation between appearing and 
vanishing. Now the question becomes how the primordial One and nothingness can be 
reconciled on the same conceptual plane? Nothing-ness is as it exists. I t is not mere 
nonbeing. It should be distinguished from void, although it is also true that in both Deleuze 
and Izutsu’s philosophy, the notion of nothingness, sometimes, is strangely identified with 
that of void.
I I I
　　The entire world for Izutsu is nothing other than the ‘I ’ emerging from the depth of 
mystic or ‘oriental’ philosophy. Of course this ‘I ’ can never be identified with an empirical 
ego nor with the Cartesian subject. The ‘I ’ here emerges as a crystallization of the entire 
immanent field into both the cognitive subject and empirical object. To describe this 
condition, Izutsu adopts the term crystallization. The point-instant of ‘I ’ as a field is 
constituted by a set of interactions, also called the ‘interpenetration of the ontological 
energies’ and ‘the mutual penetration’ of the three temporary modes of the past, present 
and future (SOP:93). Only when the ‘essence’ of things in the living world is annihilated and 
the articulated empirical structure decomposed, humans can awake to, in a more mystical 
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language, the ‘zero point of consciousness’. At the moment of encounter with this depth 
stratum of consciousness, a singular event takes place. Izutsu opted for the term ‘event’ 
rather than ‘things’. D&G also share a similar view. For them, ‘the event is not the state of 
affairs’ (WP:156). In other words, while the proposition in the sense of analytical philosophy 
deals with the state of affairs, only philosophical concepts, or conceptual thinking, can 
retroactively draw on the event, if not at time, grasping it in its movement of emergence.
　　By the term event, Izutsu intended to mean ‘an ontological “event” as one of the 
innumerable momentary happenings’ (SOP:165). A singular event, by definition a rare 
occurrence, weaves together and constitutes ‘the cosmic process of the network of all 
ontological relations’ (ibid). Everything at the every moment, in his view, is a singular 
ontological event sanctioned by a pure contingency. For Izutsu, this is the critical image of 
thought, which would be called the plane of immanence by Deleuze. Not only persons like 
shamans or religious masters but also ordinary people encounter this dimension of the 
event, at least unconsciously if not in the full consciousness of the ‘perfect human’. In such 
a singular event Izutsu thinks, all and all interpenetrates each other and interfuses with 
one another as if happening in the darkness of non-being and non-image. It opens the 
depth structure of (un)consciousness which is ‘always already’ there in an ordinary 
cognitive process. In his understanding of the notion of nihil (nihilisation) in Ibn Arabi’s 
philosophy, the event is defined as the dimension of pure potential, of the possible 
(mumkin) which actualizes and enables the surface of common consciousness and 
existential world. Izutsu explain this pure horizon of potential by recurring to the idea of 
Alãya consciousness (ãlaya-vijñãna,  阿頼耶識,  蔵識) in ‘Only Ideation schools’  of 
Buddhism (唯識学派). Alãya consciousness can be grasped as the depth stratum of un/sub 
consciousness, folding itself into the surface level of common ordinary consciousness. The 
Sanskrit term (ãlaya) conveys the meaning of storage, storehouse, and depository. It is a 
sort of archive that stocks potential modes of signification. These potential moments 
stocked as a non-articulated chaotic continuum are virtually ‘reserved’ in this symbolic 
storehouse of semantic seeds called bija. Semantic seeds are thus here virtually stored in 
order to eventually assume a variety of significations and articulations. In Izutsu’s 
philosophy, the pure potential of the archi-articulation appears as the storehouse (un- or 
sub-) of consciousness. In other word, for Izutsu, virtual unconsciousness is structured as a 
different type of language from the ordinary one. 
　　It is possible to recognize a parallel with Deleuze & Guattari’s philosophical schema. 
For them, concepts already constitute the plane of horizon of events, also called ‘the 
reservoir or reserve of purely conceptual events’ (WP:36). It is interesting to see their use of 
terms like reservoir and reserve to signify a form of storehouse. As they argue, ‘the event is 
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immaterial, incorporeal, unlivable: pure reserve (WP:156). The event is a pure immanence 
because it contains by itself what is not yet actualized and/or what resists actualization. It 
is thus very interesting that both thinkers, Izutsu, and D&G seek to unearth the dimension 
of virtuality or pure potential which is built within a shadowy storehouse or reserve. We 
should however be wary of a too easy conflation and confusion of Izutsu’s potential with 
D&G’s concept of the virtual.
　　The possible or the potential is traditionally understood as an equivalent of the 
concept of ‘dynamis’ in the lineage of Greek philosophy. Aristotle thus considered 
‘dynamis’ to be a primal material potentiality waiting for its deployment into reality, into 
‘energeia,’ as a form of embodiment in/of this world. Among a number of possibilities 
embedded in this pure potentiality, one is opted as the reality for random choices, choices 
that are nevertheless retroactively conceived as a destiny for human agency.
　　Deleuze & Guattari rather define this pure potentiality as the virtual or virtuality. They 
say,
　　‘The virtual is no longer the chaotic virtual but rather virtuality that has become 
consistent, that has become an entity formed on a plane of immanence that sections the 
chaos. This is what we call the Event, the part that eludes its own actualization in 
everything that happens’ (WP:156).
　　D&G thus carefully avoid the linear understanding or segmentation of the series of 
possible, potential and virtual (virtuality) in addressing the (singular) event.
　　Is it possible to see a point of conjunction between Deleuze and Izutsu in terms of the 
event and virtuality?  For both, the possible and the potential are radically distinct. The 
possible would have a very predictable effect in the way it combines a multiplicity of 
discrete beings. But the potential is singular by being situated with the virtual, its lingering 
reservoir immanent to every actualization and phenomenal unfolding. Although Izutsu 
never used the binary couple actual - virtual, his use of the term potential already implies 
the layer of meaning of the concept of virtuality. ‘Existence which is actus, thus spreading 
itself out far and wide, goes on producing the ten thousand things’ (ST:483). For Izutsu, the 
articulated essences of things do exist, but only in potentia, not in actus; they are neither 
actual nor real in the fullest sense.
Conclusion
039Toward a trans-local encounter within philosophy: Gilles Deleuze and Toshihiko Izutsu
　　Since The Machinic Unconscious to Chaosmosis, that is from his early thought to his 
last work, Guattari had undertaken his own ‘conceptual confusion’. This intentional 
misleading fusion claimed by Guattari is exactly the confusion that Deleuze had subtly 
tried to avoid between the virtual and the possible. In other words, Guattari, be it 
intentionally or unconsciously, ended up sometimes replacing the term virtual by the term 
possible or the potential in his works. To a certain extent, the same holds for Izutsu’s 
philosophical discourse (discourse or schema?).
　　The concept of nothingness is particularly productive concept for bringing together 
D&G’s philosophy of the virtual with Izutsu’s ‘oriental’ thought. Nothingness is not defined 
as mere wholeness, nor as emptiness in the sense of absolute negativity, but is rather 
treated as a creative or vital void, which is philosophically compatible with the notion of 
chaos. For them, the plane of immanence constitutes a section of chaos that seems to 
function as a ‘sieve’ (WP:42). This sieve stretches over chaos. This definition of the plane of 
immanence is an adequate way to grasp nothingness as an active rhizome driven from the 
void. Within this operative use of the notion of chaos in terms of a sieve as well as a 
chaosmosis, both void and fullness are related to a double dimension of intensity. In 
D&G’s ontological view, a void can function as an index of multiplicity by embracing all 
moments of the existential world. It is thus never reduced to the source of emanation of the 
One as in Plotinus. A concept is made of a chaoid as it is passing through the a multiplicity 
of planes, in particular the triad of art, science, and philosophy (WP:208).
　　Deleuze and Guattari claim that ‘chaos makes chaotic and undoes every consistency 
in the infinite’ (WP:42). The void in D&G’s philosophy, as in Izutsu’s (Orient thought?), is 
the very site of self-manifestation of multiples, a virtual no-thing on which any countable 
is actualized. They however prefer to mobilize the expression “plane of immanence” 
instead of nothingness or void.
　　For both Deleuze and Izutsu, chaos does not so much mean disorder as infinite speed, 
for all forms of things continuously take shape, emerge and vanish through chaos as 
reservoir. ‘It (chaos) is a void that is not a nothingness but a virtual, containing all possible 
particles and drawing out all possible forms, which spring up only to disappear 
immediately, without consistency or reference, without consequences (WP:118). Certainly 
there is no chaos in the One, but there is the One that permeates reality through the 
potential of chaos. In other word, the one operation of the One can be defined as 
‘chaotifying’. If things ordinarily look as if essentially distinct from each other, it is simply 
because ordinary men are not yet awake. If they were, they would chaotify these things and 
see them in their original state of undifferentiation (ST:484). This is precisely the point of 
conjunction which Izutsu found in his comparative analysis of Sufism and Taoism. I believe 
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a similar comparison is possible between Deleuze(&Guattari) and Izutsu. Of course, this is 
still an ongoing process of trans-local comparative philosophy, which is not necessary 
called ‘oriental’ in a historical or geo-philosophical sense.
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